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Constituting one historically speci c way 
of conceptualizing the relations of entitle-
ment and obligation, the model of rights is 
today hegemonic, and imbued with an eman-
cipatory aura. Yet this model has had com-
plex and contradictory implications for in-
dividuals and groups whose claims must 
be articulated within its terms. (Cowan et 
al. 2001:1, emphasis mine)
Human rights discourse is powerful and pervasive, and combines two seemingly contradictory characteris-
tics: an emancipatory capacity with a hegem-
onic, homogenizing and reductive tendency. 
Even though human rights are represented 
as pertaining to all human beings, some peo-
ple and groups are excluded from enjoying 
them. This paradoxical quality, as well as the 
widespread use of the discourse, deserves 
anthropological attention. The relation be-
tween anthropology and human rights has 
been a complex one, often  lled with ambi-
guities and ambivalence (cf. Dembour 1996). 
The anthropological debate, once focused 
on universalism of human rights versus cul-
tural relativism, has now moved on to other 
issues, such as the practice of human rights 
(Preis 1996) in different contexts. Neverthe-
less, the shadow of the previous debate still 
hovers over many current human rights 
Issues surrounding the 
“ownership” of human rights 
discourse are examined in 
relation to the variety of 
ways in which this discourse 
is utilized. It is argued that 
the instrumentalist language 
of human rights discourse 
skeletonizes social reality, 
while creating interpretive 
communities and opening up 
spaces for the dispossessed. To 
the extent that the discourse 
enables the creation of a 
symbolic community, it leads at 
the same time to the exclusion 
of some people through the 
boundary drawing process.
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works, while cultural relativism has become a part of a number of power-
ful political discourses which interact with human rights discourse. This 
happens as certain parts of anthropological work, tools and discourses 
are appropriated, often by human rights groups (Riles 2006).
One of the paradoxes of the human rights concept, singled out by Dem-
bour, is that formulation of human rights has not yet realized, while, at the 
same time, the idea of universal human rights has been asserting the sta-
tus of an “eternal truth” (1996:20). This kind of assertion of timelessness 
is often characterized as one of the characteristics of ideologies.1 Thus, it 
might be fruitful to analyse human rights discourse with respect to its 
“ideological” uses, as formulated in the question: “whose” discourse is it? 
In other words, is human rights discourse an instrument of domination 
of the more in uential societies, elites, the particular transnational mar-
ket forces, or a tool of emancipation for those in need and the means of 
protecting individuals from states and, increasingly, transnational actors 
and corporations in a globalising world (Wilson 2006)? This  rst aspect of 
human rights discourse will be labelled “hegemonic”. 
Another “ideological” aspect of human rights discourse is its role in 
the symbolic construction of community (cf. Cohen 2004) which will be 
examined in the context of the creation of a global culture of human rights. 
I argue that if the creation of human rights culture is understood as a sym-
bolic construction of community, it can be expected that through the proc-
ess of symbolic construction boundaries will be marked, thus leading to 
the exclusion of some groups and individuals. In the  nal section of this 
paper I will examine examples from the Japanese context in relation to 
issues of the symbolic construction of community, exclusion, power and 
translation, in an attempt to shed light on some of the questions posed 
above, especially in relation to the “hegemonic” and “ideological” aspects 
of the discourse. 
The notion of human rights
Rights themselves are a speci c notion that came into being in a particu-
lar historic context (as a modern Western concept), indeed, as Jones puts 
it “there have been worlds without rights” (1994:1). The idea of human 
rights is historically related to the idea of natural rights (Jones 1994:72), 
and some authors equate the two, such as John Finnis who uses the terms 
1 Ideologies in the sense used here serve as a part of self-de nition and maintaining 
the identity of a group with the aim of protecting the interests of the group (Van Dijk 
1998:26).
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synonymously (1988:198). In opposition to legal positivism, which is 
based on the analytical separation of law from morality, natural law the-
ory conceptualizes law as primarily a moral phenomenon, and tradition-
ally seeks a grounding for law in “nature” or “the natural order of things” 
(Cotterrell 2003:115-119) and as such per de nitionem applying to every-
one. This view of human rights is closely connected to the understanding 
that, conceived as valid or morally justi ed claims, they are a subclass of 
moral rights and therefore exist prior to and independently of institutions 
and institutionalized rules (Martin 2005:39). 
Natural law theories are usually founded on a certain assumption of 
human nature or human essence, from which the rights are derived, al-
though understandings of human essence or nature are conceptualized in 
a variety of ways (e.g. based on the rationality of humans). From an an-
thropological point of view, this poses a problem, since “no natural char-
acteristic constitutes a reason for the assertion that all human beings are 
of equal worth. Or, alternatively, that all the characteristics of any human 
being are being equally a reason for this assertion” (Macdonald 1984:36-
37). Not only this aspect of the natural law theories has been criticised, but 
also its fundamental understanding of rights as prior to institutionalized 
rules – “whether or not they are embodied in systems of positive law” 
(Jones 1994:81), in contrast to the theories which conceptualize rights as 
socially recognized practices (Martin 2005:38-39). Nevertheless, some of 
the authors have been seeking middle ground, de ning human rights as 
extralegal – “not because they correspond to ‘natural’ moral rights but 
because they serve to articulate political claims which make sense in a 
particular social context” (Dembour 1996:33).
What this sketchy outline indicates is that the notion of rights in the 
human rights syntagm is hardly unambiguous: as Dembour points out, 
it sometimes refers to enforceable legal rights, while “it arguably refers 
more often to moral rights which have not yet found their way in legally 
binding provisions, but hopefully will” (1996:32). In other words, it can be 
argued that the understanding of human rights as existing prior to their 
institutionalization or enforcement, i.e. as the “rights possessed by all hu-
man beings simply as being human beings” (Jones 1994:81) is perhaps the 
dominant view in human rights discourse. 
Human rights do not exist?
Although human rights are usually conceptualized as rights of all human 
beings by virtue of them being human, independently of the institution-
alization or enforcement of these rights, some authors argue that the only 
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way in which human rights can be understood is as socially recognized 
practices. Some authors, such as Donovan and Anderson, go so far as to 
claim that there are no human rights per se, because moral obligations do 
not inhere in persons but in relationships (2003:163). Moreover, Donovan 
and Anderson conclude that not only human rights do not exist per se, but 
that this fact can be used in favour of human rights advocates’ endeav-
ours, because it absolves them from seeking justi cations for rights (for 
example, some kind of “human nature” or “essence”) (2003:164). What is 
really meant by the statement that human rights do not exist as such? An 
answer to this question is indicated by Cowan, who explains that univer-
sal human rights do not exist “in the sense that rights, including so-called 
universal ones, are not natural and eternal but always emergent and cul-
turally speci c” (2001:27). Thus, the position illustrated by these exam-
ples emphasizes the aspect of human rights as socially constructed and 
produced, as a social practice (Preis 1996). Human rights, therefore, are 
said not to exist in the phenomenal world, in much the same way as Grillo 
reminds us of culture, using Vershueren’s words: “Though culture is a 
universal human phenomenon (…) cultures do not exist in any real sense 
of ‘existence’” (2003:160). This is the position underlying Dembour’s as-
sertion that rights exist only because they are talked about (1996), imply-
ing that they are socially and discursively produced, or even immanent in 
social relations as a particular form of power, as Wilson argues (1997:14). 
The position that prevails in much recent anthropological work em-
phasizes the historicity of human rights as a concept that came into being 
in the context of the rise of the modern nation-state (cf. Wilson 1997:16). 
The historicity of human rights is acknowledged even by authors who 
nevertheless argue for their universal validity, such as Donelly2 (2003). An 
approach that investigates human rights as a discourse would therefore 
seem to be an important part of the anthropological analysis of human 
rights. 
Human rights discourse as a legal discourse
The contemporary discourse3 of human rights has been described by many 
authors as being predominantly legal (Evans 2005; Hastrup 2001b and 
2 It must be noted that Donnely argues for the universality of human rights with the so-
urce in man’s moral nature, a position which is far from being univocally accepted among 
anthropologists (2003:14).
3 De nitions of discourse are numerous, ranging from linguistic, focusing on the se-
quences of verbal exchange (e.g. Van Dijk 2001), to broader philosophical approaches 
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2006) and as such having certain features pertaining to the language of 
law in general, as outlined by Bourdieu – the neutralization effect (created 
by the use of passive and impersonal constructions), and the univerzali-
zation effect (created by the use of inde nites and the intemporal present, 
 xed formulas and locutions, etc.) (1987:820). The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (in further text – UDHR), which is considered to be the 
central document in human rights discourse, begins with the statement: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another 
in spirit of brotherhood. (UDHR, Article 1)
Kirsten Hastrup gives an interesting reading of Article 1 and draws at-
tention to the natural law underlying this positive legal instrument and 
to the discrepancy between the two sentences in the article, the  rst one 
stating that human beings are entitled to human rights as a fact, and the 
second one phrased as an imperative. This imperative form undermines 
the self-evidence of the  rst part of the article, moving the statement from 
the realm of what is to the realm of what ought to be (2001b:4). She con-
cludes that “legal language, including the language of human rights, cel-
ebrates the normative and transcendent, in spite of its positive claims” 
(2001a:12).
She furthermore argues that human rights discourse is based on mod-
ernist assumptions – the faith in progress and Reason, as well as the idea 
of development towards community based on rationalistic premises of 
shared values. The human rights, that are a part of these shared values, 
are at the same time phrased as an unquestionable ahistorical truth but 
not yet realised (see Dembour 1996:20). Hastrup then concludes that 
the language of rights contains both a modernist historical outlook and a 
timeless mythical charter for global coexistence; by being timeless, human 
rights are in a sense beyond history. This is in fact a precondition for uni-
versalist aspiration, which also of necessity takes us beyond positive law. 
(Hastrup 2001a:10-11)
One of the characteristics of human rights discourse is thus that it is hi-
storically speci c, but it conceptualizes and represents rights as eternal 
building on the work of Michel Foucault, who understands discourse as a system of rep-
resentation, producing meaning and meaningful practice (see Hall:72-3). In this article 
I use discourse in this broader sense, as a conceptual tool for unifying various forms of 
communication about “human rights”, including but not limited to media reports, legal 
cases, political statements etc. 
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and timeless – it can perhaps be argued that this is one of the factors that 
contribute to it being such a powerful discourse. 
This is not the only paradox inherent in human rights discourse – it is 
formulated to protect persons from the unrestrained power of the state – 
but it is also used to express claims in relation to other individuals and 
groups and regulate relationships between them. Moreover, although the 
discourse of human rights emphasizes equality between humans, many 
people are excluded from the enjoyment of their basic human rights, as is 
the case with refugees, because it is so closely tied to the context of the na-
tion state (Dembour 1996). It conceptualizes people as having equal val-
ue, as individuals, but in practice large categories of people are excluded 
from protection. The law distinguishes between economic and political 
refugees, where the  rst group is not protected at all, being potentially 
very large in number. The second category is only partially protected un-
der Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees: the signatory states do 
not have to allow the political refugees into its territory, but cannot send 
them back if they are within its boundaries. 
In other words, although the ideology of human rights does away with the 
concept of the state to concentrate on the equal value of all human beings, 
its practice relies on the way in which individuals are classi ed in relation 
to a state. (ibid.:29)
These paradoxes can be translated into the question of the legality of hu-
man rights – in other words, human rights can be understood as legal and 
extralegal at the same time: legal in being formulated through declarati-
ons and conventions, often formulated in legal language, in being tied to 
the context of the state; but at the same time being extralegal. Using the 
same example of refugees, Dembour argues that the reason for denying 
rights to people like refugees is not that they are not “legally conside-
red human”, but that the argument should be understood the other way 
round, that the human rights are basically not legal, and therefore not 
binding, especially the Declarations. In relation to this last point Dembo-
ur (1996) compares the UDHR and the European Convention of Human 
Rights and shows that the language of the European Convention is more 
precise and sets up mechanisms for the enforcement of rights, but is less 
comprehensive than the UDHR. 
She closely examines Article 3 of the UN Declaration, dealing with 
the right to life: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person”, and its equivalent in the European Convention, Article 2, which 
begins: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of 
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is pro-
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vided by law.” After elaborating precisely the conditions for these excep-
tions it creates a mechanism for its enforcement, such as a Court, and as 
such it uses a more precise language with this aim of legal enforceability. 
Yet these precise formulations are signi cantly more restrictive (ibid.:30). 
This is just one among many examples indicating that legality, which is 
tied to the enforceable or at least instrumental aspect of rights, leads to 
reductiveness and can be constraining for the actors. 
Another issue underpins the previous analysis: how is it possible that 
people can claim their rights as human and be denied those rights as 
refugees at the same time? A part of the answer can perhaps be found in 
the work of Franz von Benda-Beckmann, who reminds us that “Human 
beings become citizens, strangers or indigenous peoples by cultural and 
legal constructions” (1997:3). He further argues that in the same society 
a variety of different legal and normative orders is likely to be operating 
simultaneously. Moreover, “within the same political organization there 
may be a number of normative constructions of the interrelationships be-
tween different normative orders” (von Benda-Beckmann 1997:16), thus 
invoking a complex notion of legal and normative pluralism. 
This also brings us to the matter of the construction of personhood in 
human rights discourse. It has often been argued that a legal language 
constructs the person as a responsible, accountable individual (La Fon-
taine 1985), and Merry shows the importance of conforming to the 
image of responsible personhood: an autonomous choice-maker, rationally 
determining her best interests, self-governing and self-disciplining. This is 
the bourgeois legal subject,4 crafted at considerable cost from the socio-
cultural variability of the world during the Enlightenment in Europe and 
transplanted through colonial processes. (Merry 2002:341)
Moreover, the human rights discourse operates with “a conditional de-
 nition of the legally protected self” which means that persons claiming 
rights are rede ned within the discourse and in order to be able to enjoy 
their rights have to act like responsible, autonomous subjects – like “good 
victims” (Merry 2003). She concludes that although claiming rights might 
empower the new subjects and give them responsibilities for resistance 
as opposed to the discourse which denies their identities, they also enter 
a particular kind of society (a sort of “interpretive community”) which is 
fragmented and exclusive (ibid.:363). Nevertheless, actors are not con -
4 Collier et al. argue that the bourgeois law by claiming to treating everyone equally 
both ignores the differences and produces them, by constructing the realm outside the law 
where inequality  ourishes (Collier et al. 2002:212).
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ned to this new identity and they often move in and out of it (cf. Merry 
2003).
This has led some authors, like O’Donovan, to examine the notion of 
the rights bearing subject which is often characterised as being abstract 
because “[the legal subject] purports to be universal (…) [and at the same 
time he is] criticised for his lack of human embodiment, for his lack of di-
versity (…) It is said that in his abstraction and in his particular choices he 
excludes women, children, the oppressed and dispossessed” (1996:353). 
The rights-bearing subject – as constructed in the human rights discourse 
– is fundamentally individual, and the human rights are envisaged as 
individual rights. Recently there has been an attempt to include group 
rights within the framework of human rights, but Hastrup shows how 
introducing cultural and group rights can undermine the aims of the 
human rights: “granting rights to particular groups on the basis of their 
distinction introduces an element of exclusion that potentially subverts 
the principle of equality” (2001b:182). Therefore, the concept of person 
underlying the human rights discourse, especially to the extent to which 
it is a legal discourse, basically continues to be linked to the image of a re-
sponsible subject, an accountable individual. In this sense, human rights 
discourse as a legal discourse does not re ect the diversity of social life. 
Moreover, it has often been argued that the legalist language is a particu-
larly reductive one and that it does not adequately represent common 
good (Hastrup 2006:27). One of the main reasons why the discourse as 
it is does not represent common good or communal values, especially in 
particular local contexts, is that legal languages are not suitable for rep-
resentation because they need to be transparent in order to be ef cient 
(ibid.:25). 
Thus, while Hastrup emphasizes that human rights discourse as a legal 
language cannot be representational, it does have the ability to “bring into 
existence that of which it speaks” (2006:20) and reminds us of Geertz’s 
understanding of law as “a way of imagining the real” (Geertz 1983), thus 
invoking the power of language as a performative resource: 
While no legal language can make a claim to representing the world, it 
can still suggest a particular way of imagining it, and thereby gradually 
make it real. If human rights law reduces or condenses global complexity 
to a particular and rather narrow genre of statements, it also – by the same 
stroke – becomes part of that same complexity, and a signi cant factor in 
its transformation. (Hastrup 2001a:21)
Underlying the points raised by all the authors mentioned in this section 
is fundamentally a question about the nature of the human rights discour-
se as a legal one, a question also raised by Wilson on representing human 
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rights violations: this legalistic language is effective because it speaks to 
the institutions of the nation state, it is a language that can be understood 
by the state agencies (Wilson 1997:154). Wilson thus draws attention to 
the way in which the power of human rights discourse is somehow tied to 
its form, more precisely, the legality of its form and the emergent questi-
on: whether the effectiveness of the discourse of human rights is inescapably tied 
to its legalism? The instrumentalism of the legal language is a double ed-
ged sword, as has been argued above, creating particular conceptions of 
personhood, abstract and decontextualized and having the same kind of 
dehumanizing capacity as the “language of abusive forms of governance” 
(Wilson 1997:155) but at the same time creating “interpretive communiti-
es” with a shared language and opening up spaces for the dispossessed 
and members of muted groups (cf. Ardener 1977:xii). 
In his analysis of human rights reports Wilson points to the prevailing 
legal rhetoric and notes that a signi cant decontextualization occurs in the 
reports almost as a rule: 
Documenting human rights violations is about reporting evidence, not 
creating a narrative, since it is incomplete and is abstracted from the moti-
vation and intentionality of actors. (1997:145)
In other words – social narrative is skeletonised by the law (cf. Geertz 1983). 
Moreover, the reports construct a speci c kind of personhood, they “tend 
to bifurcate individuals into either victims or perpetrators, but these same 
individuals might wish to assert another alternative identity (e.g. survi-
vors, freedom  ghters)” (Wilson and Mitchell 2006:5). In her analysis of 
Wilson’s observation, Marilyn Strathern agrees that descriptions of vic-
tims strip them of speci c social circumstances, such as family and class 
background, but argues that what is taking place is 
not so much detachment from social context as such, a logical impossibili-
ty, but the removal of an entity from one context into another. The victim is 
re-described in the kind of bare detail similar to presumption of (human) 
equality before the law, the new social context being the universe of others 
who have suffered human rights abuse. (2004:230)
I agree with the perspective proposed by Strathern and I think that the re-
contextualization mentioned here is occurring within a new context which 
is an abstract one, a kind of “imagined community” (cf. Anderson 1983).
Issues of power in human rights discourse have been raised by Tony 
Evans, who argues that human rights are best understood as three dif-
ferent discourses that are overlapping each other: philosophical, political 
and legal, the last one being dominant. Evans examines what interests 
are served by the dominance of the legal discourse over the other two 
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and asserts that it “acts to reify the freedoms necessary to legitimate mar-
ket discipline by providing a framework that is promoted as immutable 
and binding” (2005:1062). The Foucauldian concept of discipline he in-
vokes “refers to a mode of social organization that operates without the 
need for coercion” (ibid.:1054). Discipline is, thus, internalized and sus-
tained through surveillance, in the case of market discipline through sur-
veillance “undertaken by international and regional agencies – for exam-
ple, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, the European 
Union (EU), and the North American free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)” 
(ibid.:1057). In his opinion the consequences of human rights discourse 
are obscured, because 
while the discourse makes claims for the pursuit of human dignity and 
community, it also provides the context where free will, equality within 
exchange relations, and property converge to create social relations charac-
terized by sel shness, gain and private interests, rather than the pursuit of 
human dignity and community. Despite the mechanisms of self-discipline 
at the center of market discipline, there remains a need for authoritative 
expert pronouncements and idioms when norms are transgressed [which] 
(…) is the central role of international law. (ibid.:1057)
This argument seems to set the stage for looking into the question of what 
kind of discourse is human rights discourse: is it primarily a hegemonic 
one, as Evans’s argument suggests, or is it in the  rst place an emancipa-
tory and protective discourse? The enforceability of human rights disco-
urse relies on its legality, based on an instrumentalist language which is 
particularly restrictive, rede ning persons as rights-bearing subjects and 
excluding some at the same time. These issues of exclusion are insepara-
ble from the origin of human rights as a tool for the protection of indivi-
duals and groups from the unrestrained rule of governments within the 
nation-state framework. 
Rights and globalization: Creation of a global community?
Human rights discourse and the processes of globalization are connected 
on many levels:  rstly, globalization processes have contributed to the 
spreading of the discourse of human rights which emerged in particular 
historic circumstances in the West. Thus, the discourse of human rights 
has often been described as hegemonic, but at the same time “global 
rights discourses are appropriated in local communities and (…) global 
discourses are themselves constructed out of local struggles” (Merry 
2002:303). Furthermore, Wilson reminds us that we should not think of 
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globalization merely as “a process of homogenization and integration, 
but [as involving] a proliferation of diversity as well” (1997:12). Perhaps 
looking at these multilayered ties can help to elucidate certain aspects of 
both “globalization” and human rights discourse. 
The criticism of human rights as being primarily individual rights and 
therefore promoting individualist, liberal values is well known. The ori-
gin of human rights as an instrument for the protection of individuals 
against the state and even the majority wishes embodied in governmental 
policies (Cotterrell 2003:161) is rarely disputed. Nevertheless, it is often 
argued that, by being individual, human rights are not necessarily indi-
vidualist, and that furthermore the idea of human rights is tied to the 
notion of common good5– 
human rights are not held solipsistically by isolated Leibnizian monads 
but by socially situated individuals, in virtue of their shared humanity and 
social consciousness of the moral signi cance of human dignity. (Duquette 
2005:60)
Moreover, it has even been argued that human rights discourse is a basis 
for creating a culture of human rights in the sense of a “community of 
values” and that this culture of human rights is becoming global.
Kirsten Hastrup analyses the concept of a global culture of human 
rights in the context of morality and the creation of universal morality. 
On the one hand we are engulfed by images of human suffering in distant 
parts of the world, on the other hand new techniques of distancing have 
been created: 
(…) globalization not only connects but also disconnects people from each 
other. Somewhat paradoxically, the satellite-borne images of sufferers el-
sewhere on the globe tend to  x them as eternal “others” rather than “like 
us” (…) Intellectuals likewise contribute to the dehumanization of the glo-
bal space by repeatedly referring to the process of globalization as if devo-
id of human agency (…) (2006:18)
Hastrup also argues that the “culture of rights” represented as a global 
culture is a rhetorical  gure, a myth representing history and human-ma-
de as unquestionable and natural, the point that she makes in relation 
to the creation of universal morality as mentioned by Zygmunt Bauman 
5 John Finnis shows how certain expressions (on the example of UDHR) within human 
rights discourse emphasize communitarian values like “public morality and public or-
der” and stresses that “the human rights can only be secured in certain sorts of milieu – a 
context or framework of mutual respect and trust and common understanding” (Finnis 
1989:216).
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(Hastrup 2001b:2, 2001a:8). Furthermore, she adds that every culture, in 
order to be conceived as a whole has to be represented and perceived as 
such, in other words, the feeling of community has to be symbolically 
created (cf. Cohen 2004) and a language is usually a basis for the creation 
of a shared communal feeling, but as argued earlier, the legalist language 
of human rights is a particularly reductive one and not well suited for 
representation (2006:22).
In my view, if the creation of human rights culture is understood as a 
symbolic construction of community, it can be expected that through the 
process of symbolic construction boundaries will be marked, thus lead-
ing to the exclusion of some groups and individuals. It has been noted 
that the human rights discourse has both of these features – it creates 
an “interpretive community” as mentioned above, but although it asserts 
universal humanity, it is often exclusive in practice, perhaps due to the 
fact that in their legal aspect human rights are tied to the nation-state. 
The boundaries of political communities are a focus of the work of Seyla 
Benhabib in which she examines the tension between the universality of 
human rights claims as opposed to the exclusivity of particular national 
identities, “between the expansive and inclusionary principles of moral 
and political universalism, as anchored in universal human rights, and 
the particularistic and exclusionary conceptions of democratic closure” 
(2004:21). 
Moreover, the democratic legitimacy of the state seems to be built on 
this very tension, nation-states granting rights within a particular (bound-
ed) political community, but legitimized by conforming to universal hu-
man rights principles (Benhabib 2004:44). This aspect of human rights dis-
course can be understood as basically ideological. This sort of ideology is 
invoked in the situation of a loss of orientation, as Clifford Geertz argues 
(1973:219), which can in turn be related to processes of globalization and 
rapid change in the contemporary world. Hastrup refers to this aspect of 
human rights discourse as the glue of communities (2001b:7).
The idea of human rights as a global culture can be connected to the 
wider notion of cosmopolitanism, the human rights “revolution” after 
1945 being heralded as its greatest achievement (Bauböck 2002:115). As 
the exclusionary practices resulting from the discourse of human rights 
can be partially understood as a consequence of its tie to the context of the 
nation-state, it is interesting to note that “[i]n contrast to multicultural-
ism, cosmopolitanism is now increasingly invoked to avoid the pitfalls of 
essentialism or some kind of zero-sum, all-or-nothing understanding of 
identity issues within a nation-state” (Vertovec and Cohen 2002:3). 
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Cosmopolitanism in this sense, “largely following Kant, (…) refers 
to a philosophy that urges us all to be ‘citizens of the world’, creating a 
worldwide community of humanity committed to common values” (Ver-
tovec and Cohen 2002:10). As the human rights model seems to  t per-
fectly the intention of advocates of cosmopolitanism, it might be useful 
to take a look at some of the criticism pointed toward ideas of cosmopoli-
tanism: “communitarians say that commitments to broad cosmopolitan 
ideals represent a view that ‘embodies all the worst aspects of classical 
liberalism – atomism, abstraction, alienation from one’s roots, vacuity of 
commitment, indeterminacy of character, and ambivalence towards the 
good’”. The argument set out by Martha Nussbaum that can be used in 
defence of cosmopolitan ideals is: “we think of ourselves not as devoid of 
local af liation, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles” and 
multiple af liations (cf. Vertovec and Cohen 2002:12). 
Finally, it might be interesting to look at a tendency mentioned by Ver-
tovec and Cohen, towards a proactive approach in promoting a shared set 
of values, a sort of cosmopolitan community (2002:2); doubtless, this does 
resemble the hegemonic aspect of human rights discourse, which brings 
us once again to one of the central questions underlying this analysis: 
whose discourse is it – is it primarily a dominant, hegemonic discourse 
or a discourse of the disempowered, an emancipatory discourse of the 
dispossessed? Hopefully, at this point it is clear that there can be no sim-
ple answer to this question. Although it is dif cult to dispute the fact that 
the human rights discourse is a powerful, if not hegemonic one which 
produces exclusions, Merry reminds us that it has also been appropriated 
and reappropriated by various groups: “Groups such as indigenous peo-
ples, ethnic minorities, and women (…) as well as military of cials and 
government employees (…) use human rights language and techniques” 
(2006:38) serving some of them as an emancipatory discourse, others as a 
legitimating discourse. 
The argument against an understanding of human rights discourse as 
primarily a “hegemonic” one is made by Richard Wilson, based on the 
concept of legal pluralism as being present in all societies: “being subject 
to overlapping local, national and trasnational legal codes. These norma-
tive orders are (…) hierarchised according to shifting power inequalities” 
(1997:11). Furthermore, he argues that “[j]ust because a cultural form is 
global, it does not mean that everyone relates to it in the same way – 
its interpretation depends on local and individual value distinctions” 
(ibid.:12). In examining this issue – the hegemonic and ideological aspects 
of the discourse, as well as the ones discussed in the previous chapters, it 
might be useful to look at a particular example – the example of Japan.
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Human rights discourse and Japan
Although the “universalism of human rights vs. cultural relativism” de-
bate has slowly moved out of the focus of theoretical attention in the 1990s 
(even though it was not  nally resolved), it took a particular form in the 
East Asian context. It was based on a cultural relativist position which has 
been formulated in terms of “Asian values”: the argument underlying it 
is a derivative of the argument that “runs that the individual logic of the 
human rights ideology does not suit the more communitarian logic of 
Non-Western societies” (Dembour 2001:59), in particular with the “Asian 
values” of community and harmony which are asserted to be superim-
posed on individual interests. 
Inoue argues the inauthenticity of “Asian values” and labels the dis-
course based on this concept and rejecting human rights as inadequate 
for Asian societies as an Orientalising (Said 1978) discourse, resting on the 
abuse of “Western normative language” (Inoue 1999:30). Inoue singles out 
three main fallacies of the “Asian values” discourse: it draws power from 
asserting the sovereignty of the state, although it is a concept originated 
in the West, like the human rights concept which it rejects for its origin; 
secondly, East Asian governments sometimes consider human rights as 
temporarily unattainable, at least until subsistence is assured and signi -
cant development achieved, but “they fail to see the importance of politi-
cal liberties for the realization of rights to subsistence” (ibid.:35). Finally, 
The Asian values discourse does not con ne itself to a strategic manipu-
lation of Western principles. It goes further to assert Asian cultural uniqu-
eness, based on the old dualism of Asia as the Orient and Euro-American 
countries as the Occident. (ibid.:37)
“Asian values” rhetoric, similar to the cultural relativist critique in gene-
ral, is based on the underlying “essentialist” view of cultures as bounded 
and static entities that “determine individual and collective identities and 
the subject’s place in social and political schemes” (Grillo 2003:160, emp-
hasis IK). Cultural relativist discourses in Japan (both scholarly and pu-
blic) are part of a wider body of work known as Nihonjinron. Nihonjinron 
genre is a very popular body of works about Japanese (it means literally 
“discussions of the Japanese” or “treatises on Japaneseness”). As Kelly 
explains, 
the term refers particularly to a publishing boom of national character stu-
dies in Japan that has engaged academic scholarship and the mass media 
for the last 30 years – “Who are we Japanese” the Ninonjinron literature 
asks, and it answers the question not for the historical moment but for all 
time. (1988:365)
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Thus, the Nihonjinron discourse has at least one characteristic of ideology 
– historical particularities represented as timeless truth. This is precisely 
what has been argued by many social scientists writing about this genre – 
that it is a cultural ideology (Dale 1986; Marfording 1997).
This genre is very wide and it covers topics ranging from language, de-
cision-making and economic success to Japanese sensitivity, but as Dale 
argues in his book with an expressive title “The Myth of Japanese Unique-
ness”, there are some common characteristics of this vast literature: 
In contrast to modern empirical research on Japan, the Nihonjinron are cha-
racterized by [several] major assumptions or analytical motivations. Fir-
stly, they implicitly assume that Japanese constitute a culturally and soci-
ally homogeneous racial entity, whose essence is virtually unchanged from 
prehistorical times down to the present day. Secondly, they presuppose 
that the Japanese differ radically from all other known peoples. (1986:35)
Dale points to some common underlying ideas that are used to explain 
and de ne Japanese “uniqueness” and shows that many of these essenti-
alist conceptualizations of Japanese culture are connected with some form 
of biological determinism, or give explanations in terms of historical me-
ans of production. One thing these various writings have in common is 
their construction in opposition to the other, usually the West.
It can be argued that this conceptualisation in contrast to some other 
entity is a widespread mechanism through which groups construct their 
identity, and that is precisely the context in which we should analyse the 
discourse of “uniqueness” of Japanese culture – as one way of “symbolic 
construction of community”, to use Anthony Cohen’s term. Moreover, 
Cohen asserts that “the symbolic expression of community and its bound-
aries increases in importance as the actual geo-social boundaries of the 
community are undermined, blurred or otherwise weakened.” Thus, the 
proliferation of works implying or explicitly asserting the “uniqueness” 
of Japanese culture in the period after the “opening-up” of Japan can be 
understood in the context of her internationalization (cf. Hook 1992:2). 
This is the context in which the “Asian values” discourse, which a priori 
rejects human rights as Western, should be understood (cf. Marfording 
1997).
However, rejection of oversimpli ed polarized value oppositions con-
nected to “essentialized” understandings of culture does not mean a de-
nial of the speci city of the “local” context. In the case of Japan, this is the 
context of plural normative and legal systems that have developed over 
time, in what could be described as “layers”, with various in uences from 
the outside in different historic periods. The concept of rights did not ex-
ist in the Japanese language prior to its introduction in the 19th century, 
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when the concept was introduced from the translation of an international 
law text into Chinese. The characters used in this new translated concept 
implied “consideration of pro t”, which hardly had positive connotations 
for Japanese (Ishida 1986:12-13). The term was used in the Meiji Constitu-
tion of 1889, but in the beginning denoted primarily the rights of the state 
in relation to other states, in the international context into which Japan 
was forced, and it mostly did not refer to personal rights – “domestic 
society in Japan would have to adjust its laws and political structures in 
order to actualize the idea of personal rights – precisely the issue domi-
nating the Japanese politics between 1874 and 1890” (Howland 2002:129). 
This was a period when Japan was often depicted as backward and even 
inferior because of the lack of protection of personal rights, (e.g. women’s 
rights), both in the international and domestic political discourses (Saso 
1990:40). 
In post-war Japan the fundamental document for the analysis of the 
context for human rights is the Constitution (that expresses commitment 
to human rights) written under occupational forces in 1947, but although 
the Japanese people as a whole were not involved in its adoption, it has 
not been revised up to this day (Neary 2002:20). The national referendum 
on constitutional reform has recently been made possible by the passage 
of the new national referendum law, but the changes proposed are not 
likely to in uence the parts important for this analysis. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that Prime Minister Abe, calling for a “bold review” of 
the Constitution, pointed out that “[t]he fundamental values – the princi-
ple that sovereignty rests with the people, basic human rights and paci-
 sm – these have become accepted common values of the Japanese peo-
ple over the 60 years [since the Constitution was passed]” (Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun 2006, 13 November). This relatively recent example can perhaps 
be interpreted as the case of legitimizing use of human rights discourse, 
as a legitimation for the state and government actions both in the interna-
tional context and in relation to its citizens.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that foreign concepts and legal frame-
work were introduced from outside and remained unchanged. Williams, 
in his book on “The Rights to Life in Japan” shows that 
the foreign concept of the right to life has been modi ed in the course of 
internalization both by structures inherent in Japanese society and by that 
society’s tendency to emphasize the particular social nexuses which stand 
against the right to life provision. (1997:100)
This can be explained in terms of normative and legal pluralism – Wi-
lliams shows that the new legal system coexists with the previous ones, 
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which are not completely abolished and parts of these lower, older, layers 
sometimes permeate the new system superimposed on them (ibid.:100). 
Thus, looking at a formal and institutional level the “hegemonic” aspect 
of human rights discourse might be present to some extent, the present 
legal system in Japan being to some extent a result of the pressure of inter-
national society, but can hardly be understood as absolute, because 
the local appropriation of transnational institution (…) transforms un-
derlying cultural categories and practices. However, at the same time, 
the appropriated institution is itself adapted and transformed. (Merry 
2001:49)
In the institutional context, translation seems to be an extremely impor-
tant aspect of local (re)construction of the human rights framework, espe-
cially in a case like this, where the term “rights” itself was not known and 
had to be introduced through translation. An interesting case in point is 
given by Goodman with respect to the introduction of the UN Conventi-
on on the Rights of the Child into Japan:
It is of no little signi cance that there exist in Japan three competing Ja-
panese translations of the Convention (…) – by the government, by the 
Japanese Branch of UNICEF and by the Kokusai Kyoukuhou Kenkyuukai 
– each of which represents most closely the interpretation of the Conventi-
on that each group would like to see implemented. (Goodman 1996:110)
This example of the control over the discourse can be linked to the ideo-
logical aspect of the discourse and the process of recontextualization which 
involves “an act of control, and in regard to the differential exercise of such 
control the issue of social power arises” (Bauman and Briggs 1990:76). 
Translation is just one part of a wider process of recontextualization, la-
belled “vernacularization” by Merry, referring to the ways in which tran-
snational ideas are reshaped and adapted to local institutions and mean-
ings. She introduces another useful term – indigenization, referring to 
shifts in meaning – particularly to the way new ideas are framed and pre-
sented in terms of existing cultural norms, values, and practices. Indigeni-
zation is the symbolic dimension of vernacularization. (2006:39)
These notions can both be related to the wider notion of cultural transla-
tion and questions of how concepts can be translated between social and 
cultural contexts. The main problem with cultural translation, as Edwin 
Ardener pointed out, is maintaining the distinction; otherwise we are fa-
cing the threat of the “paradox of total translation” or “a total remapping 
of the other social space in the entities of the translating one” (Ardener 
1989:178). 
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Along these lines, Hastrup reminds us that cultural translation “must 
be about disequation rather than equation. Cultural translation is about 
maintaining distinctions, not about obliterating them” (2001a:16). This is 
a problem that anthropologists face all the time, and it seems to be the 
problem that human rights advocates and activists face in various lo-
cal contexts, having to balance between two poles of presenting human 
rights, both as something familiar and as something introduced as new 
– presenting human rights in a way that is likely to be adopted and un-
derstood but presenting them as a part of an existing framework that does 
not help to foster change and does not open the space for emancipatory 
action (see Merry 2006:41). The different translations of the Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child mentioned above are likely to be distributed along 
this continuum, the one whose intention is to introduce change perhaps 
less presenting the rights of the child as something already present as a 
norm. 
One aspect of vernacularization of human rights was indicated in the 
book “The Ritual of Rights in Japan”, an analysis of “new rights” move-
ments and patient’s rights in particular by Feldman, in which he shows 
that 
rights talk in Japan appears most likely to be used in con icts where there 
is more than one individual who believes s/he is aggrieved. Because the 
cultural myths about rights powerfully suggest that asserting rights is a 
sign of sel shness and conceit, people are understandably reluctant to in-
dividually (…) assert their rights. (2000:163)
His book shows how the human rights discourse in Japan is gaining pro-
minence in recent times, but is used in a quite different way than in the 
American context: ligitation, for example (especially in the individual ca-
ses) is still rare and not widely acceptable. Thus, although human rights 
discourse is introduced from the outside and is gaining a certain impetus, 
it is also providing certain groups with a language to express their positi-
on, but is used in a speci c way within the “local” context.
A speci c use of the discourse in the Japanese context, as in the case of 
claiming (personal) rights in groups, rather than individually, can to some 
extent be linked to the issue of the construction of personhood. Although 
it has been shown that it is important to avoid the danger of “essential-
izing” certain cultural traits, as in the case of “Asian values” rhetoric, it 
can still be asserted that human rights discourse is tied to a very speci c 
notion of the person, constructed as an autonomous, responsible, rights-
bearing subject or individual. On the other hand, even if we reject the idea 
that the Japanese have a speci c kind of self, “socio-centric self”, a kind 
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of self dependent on others, as opposed to Western “egocentric self” (cf. 
Lindholm 1997), as well as other disputed concepts bringing us back onto 
the terrain of Nihonjinron, it can be noted that the concept of person un-
derlying human rights discourse in general is to some extent at odds with 
some of the values prevailing in Japanese society with the importance 
placed on cooperation and group belonging (Nakane 1967) – although, of 
course, these social values are not absolute, the same in all segments of 
society and unchanging. Finally, it should not be forgotten that although 
it is reasonable to look at human rights discourse within the framework 
of Japan as a unity – a nation-state (because of the importance of institu-
tional context) it is necessary to remember that Japan is not a homogene-
ous society (as of course no society ever is), even though it is often repre-
sented as such. In fact, as Wiener argues in his book “Japan’s Minorities: 
The Illusion of Homogeneity”, Japan is inhabited by diverse populations 
and minorities that were not only excluded but also concealed under the 
master narrative of cultural and racial homogeneity (1997). Furthermore, 
although the ruling elites and the Nihonjinron literature often depict Japa-
nese society as classless (Okomoto and Rohlen 1988; Nakane 1967), the 
social diversity should not be underestimated. This is important in the 
context of an analysis of human rights discourse because the uses of dis-
courses vary among different social groups within the same society; the 
government can use such discourse as a part of their legitimizing strategy, 
while some “muted” or discriminated groups can use it as an emancipa-
tory tool (as in the case of “new rights” movements in Japan). Moreover, 
the position of minority groups is closely related to the issues of exclusion 
in the case of human rights discourse in the nation-state context, as dis-
cussed above. 
In relation to the central question underlying this analysis, “whose dis-
course is it?”, it can be concluded that human rights discourse in Japan 
serves different groups and persons and to a variety of purposes. Firstly, 
it has been introduced under the in uence of international society, which 
represents a “hegemonic” aspect of the discourse. Secondly, it has also 
been used for legitimation by the state and the government, both in rela-
tion to its citizens and the international society, thus re ecting an “ideo-
logical” aspect of human rights. The discourse has also been used by per-
sons and groups seeking to improve their position, like the participants 
of “new rights” movements. Although the discourse is based on a certain 
concept of person as a responsible, autonomous rights-bearing subject, 
and is to some extent alien to the Japanese context, it has not remained 
unchanged, neither on the grass-root level (cf. Feldman 2000) nor on the 
institutional one (cf. Williams 1997).
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Concluding remarks
It has been shown that the human rights discourse is to a large extent legal 
and as such is quite reductive, which has led to the question of whether 
the effectiveness of the discourse is tied to its form. Doubtless, to the ex-
tent to which the effectiveness of the discourse is understood in terms of 
its enforceability, its legal form with all its negative “skeletonizing” (cf. 
Geertz 1983) effects seems unavoidable. However, human rights discourse 
is not con ned to its legal aspect; it also serves in many other contexts and 
is used in a variety of ways by different actors, and opens up spaces for 
thinking about rights which have not yet been realized and might not be 
enforceable but provide an emancipatory space.
Even though the capacity of human rights discourse for acting as a ba-
sis for a global culture of human rights, a kind of worldwide imagined com-
munity of values is disputable (for a number of reasons, one of them being 
the reductiveness in terms of representation of social variability and se-
mantic hollowness of the legal language it is based on; cf. Hastrup 2001b), 
it can be argued that it does offer ground for agreement6 and serves as a 
shared language, thus creating some kind of “interpretive community” 
(Preis 1996). At the same time, and in a way which can be understood as 
typical of the symbolic construction of community (cf. Cohen 2004), it cre-
ates boundaries and exclusions: by constructing persons as rights-bearing 
subjects and thus constructing conditional de nitions of subjectivity, and 
excluding those who do not conform to this construction or do not  t in 
it; and also because of the paradoxical nature of the discourse, which is 
in its instrumental aspects still largely tied to the context of the nation-
state, thus excluding those with an unclear relation to the state, such as 
refugees. 
In asking “whose discourse it really is” we are in fact posing a ques-
tion about the ways the discourse can be used, depending on who uses 
it. There are at least four elementary ways in which the human rights dis-
course is used:  rstly, to protect individuals and groups from oppression 
by the state, the primary aim in the historical context of the creation of the 
discourse after the Second World War; secondly, to promote the interests 
of individuals in relation to other individuals (as was shown in the case of 
battered women claiming their rights in relation to their husbands and to 
6 Martha Nussbaum argues that the language of rights plays a signi cant role in public 
discourse for a number of reasons, one of them emphasizing the aspect of human rights as 
a ground for agreement: “the language of rights preserves a sense of the terrain of agree-
ment” (Nussbaum 1997:296).
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society in general, as described by Merry 2003); thirdly, the use of human 
rights discourse as a legitimation for democratic nation-states, and  nally 
the use of the discourse as pressure against the state in an international 
regime, which could be labelled as a “hegemonic” aspect of human rights 
discourse (e.g. in the case of Japan after the Meiji Revolution when Japan 
was characterized as backward).
Thus, it is clear that discourse can be used in various ways by differ-
ent groups, as has been shown using various examples from the Japanese 
context. Moreover, as the analysis of the various conceptualizations of the 
notion of human rights shows, the discourse itself is not homogeneous, 
because it rests on a plurality of conceptualizations, theoretical elabora-
tions and justi cations of rights. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the 
discourse itself comprises different “dialects” (Glendon 1991:xi) and can 
be put to a variety of uses, there is a good reason to conceptualize it as 
unitary, because its representation as unity is part of the discourse’s per-
vasiveness and power. In fact, this unity of a discourse and its variability 
from within are not in contradiction, because it is perhaps necessary for 
a discourse asserting universality to be  exible or “ uid”. Finally, as Wil-
son (2006:78) points out, “the doctrinal ambiguity of human rights talk 
provides one explanation for its apparent success in bringing together a 
broad range of distinct, and sometimes openly contradictory, kinds of po-
litical claims.”
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Unutar i izvan nove globalne zajedice.
Diskurs ljudskih prava u Japanu i drugdje
Sažetak
U lanku se razmatraju pitanja “vlasništva” nad diskursom ljudskih prava i nudi 
njegova antropološka analiza, posebice s obzirom na njegove pravne izvanprav-
ne aspekte. Središnje pitanje “ iji je diskurs ljudskih prava”, odnosi se na razli ite 
na ine na koje se koristi. S jedne strane, radi se o utjecajnom diskursu koji za 
posljedicu nerijetko ima isklju enost odre enih kategorija ljudi, dok je ga s druge 
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strane preuzimaju i za svoje svrhe koriste razli ite skupine. Diskurs se, u tom 
smislu, prevodi u novim okolnostima i rekontekstualizira, što je prikazano na 
primjeru Japana. Instrumentalisti ki jezik ljudskih prava skeletonizira društvenu 
stvarnost, dok istovremeno omogu uje stvaranje interepretativne zajednice i otva-
ra prostor za obespravljene. Njegova u inkovitost kao pravnog jezika esto je 
upravo povezana s njegovim ograni avaju im aspektima. Štoviše, stvaranje sim-
boli ke zajednice koju omogu uje samo je po sebi popra eno isklju enjem nekih 
osoba u tijeku procesa povla enja granica. U zaklju ku, prividne kontradikcije i 
paradoksi ljudskih prava interni su i inherentni diskursu samome. 
!ljudska prava, diskurs, simboli ka zajednica, globalizacija, rekontekstualizacija]
